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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab
GENERAL MILLS, IXC., a C'orporation of the State of Delaware, doing business under
the trade name of SPERRY
FLOUR COMPA~"Y, Western
Division of General Mills, Inc.,
and ZURICH GENER..lL ACCIDENT AND LIABILITY
INSURANCE C 0 :M PAN Y,
LIMITED,
Plaintiffs,

No. 6192

vs.
INDUSTRIAL OOMMISSIO~
OF UTAH and OLGA LASSEN HANSEN,
Defend~nts.

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF
Defendant Olga Lassen Hansen is the only defendant who has filed a brief herein. Apparently she makes
four contentions:
I. 'That the plaintiffs did not withdraw their stipulation that Marius Hansen was injured March 17, 1938
while in the course of his employment.
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II.

That the employer's reports of injury (Tr. 1

and 2) and certain letters from plaintiffs' attorneys are
evidence that Marius Hansen was injured March 17,
1938 while in the course of employment.
III.

That the testimony of Esther Peterson is

barred by the provisions of !Section 104-49-2 (3), Revised
Statutes of Utah 1933.
IV. That plaintiffs could not withdraw from their
stipulation.
We shall discuss the propositions in their order.

I.
The record answers contention number I in a very
positive manner. At the first hearing in Ogden June 5,
1939 on page 4, 1 T. (we have heretofore designated the
two transcripts of evidence as 1 T. and 2 T.) the following occurs:
'·'Commissioner Knerr: * * * Are you willing to admit that on March 17, 1938 the d~
ceased herein was injured by reason of an aCCIdent arising out of or in the course of his employment while employed by the .Sperry Flour Company~''

"Mr. Olmstead:

We will so admit."

Counsel apparently contend that because the word
"admit" was used the matter was not a stipulation and
not so understood by the parties. However, with referSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ence to this contention we find (2 T. 25) the following by
Mr. Olmstead:
"But in new of what I know now it lwt'Ollll'S
neeessarv for me to withdraw from that stipulation and" to advise the parties that we are making
an issue on the question of whether or not Mr.
Hansen was engaged in-Mr. Hansen was in fact
injured in the course of his employment. I state
that into the record at this time so that the other
parties may be able to meet the issue.''
Thereupon the Commission continued the case for
twenty-four hours. The parties were given definite warning that the matter was continued for twenty-four hours
'in order that the parties might meet the issue. Mr. Olmstead clearly indicated that the stipulation he was referring to was the one that he had entered into by his
admission heretofore set forth. To say that because it
was -characterized as an admission in one place and a
stipulation in another it thereby cannot be dassified as
a stipulation is merely quibbling. Mr. Olmstead clearly
indicated that he regarded his admission as a ·stipulation
and that he was withdra"\\-i.ng from it. It makes no difference what it was characterized. The fact of the matter is that the plaintiffs notified everyone that they would
not now eoncede that Mr. Hansen was injured on March
17th by an aecident arising out of or in the course of his
employment. The parties were put upon notice of this
fact.

No one objected to it and the Commission per-

mitted withdrawal from the stipulation by ·continuing the
case to receive the evidence ,controverting it, and on the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

following day by receiving the evidence that showed the
admission or stipulation, call it wha·t you will, to be untrue.
Before Mr. Olmstead withdrew from the stipulation
he advised the ·Commission and the parties that he had
a ·subpne.na for a witness who would testify that Mr.
Hansen was not in ·the course of his employment but on
an undertaking of his own at the time of his injury; that
he was not injured o:n March 17th but on March 20th,
three days after the date he claims to have been injured.
(2·T. 23, 24, 25)
He clearly stated that at the first hearing and up to
that time plaintiffs had been laho·ring under the impression that the injury occurred on March 17th in the course
of Mr. Hansen's employment ' and at that time it was
stipu.lated between the parties that Mr. Hansen was injured on that date in the course of his employment", but
that now it was neeessary to withdraw from that stipulation. The only place in the record where Mr. Olmstead
agreed that Mr. Hansen was injured on Mareh 17, 1938,
while in the course of his employment is the admission
(1 'T. 4), so that it is perfectly obvious and apparent that
what he was referring to as a ·stipulation was that admission.
1
'

While the Commissioner did not formally rule that
the stipulation ·might be withdrawn, he continued the case
until two o'clock of the following day in order to allow
the introduction of the evidence showing the stipulation
to be untrue, and on the following day such evidence was
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admitted and reeeived. So that the parties had ample
warning that there was now no evidence in the reeord on
this vital question, a'nd on the following day they appeared with their attorney, and at that time neither the
parties nor their attorney made any objeetion to the
withdrawal from the &tipulation or to the introdudion
of the evidence showing it to have been improvident.

In the case of Brink t'. Indu-strial Commission, 15 N.
E. (2d} 491, cited by us in our original brief, there was
no formal ruling on the withdrawal of the stipulation,
but the eourt treated the stipulation as though it had
been withdrawn because the Commission proceeded to
hear the evidence exactly as it did in this case. The court
said:
"In the light of that affidavit the stipulation was
improvidently made and should be set aside, since
it does not appear that to do so would work any
injusti~ to the defendant.''
There can .be nG question that the plaintiffs made an
issue of the contention and denied that Marius Hansen
was injured March 17, 1938, by reason of an accident arising out of or in the course of his employment, presented
positive evidence to show that he was not so injured,
whi·ch evidence is all there is in the record on that point.

II.
It is obvious from the statement of Mr. Olmstead at
the last hearing that up to that time everyone had been
laboring under the impression that Marins Hansen was
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injured March 17, 1938 while in the course of his employment. Of cour·se the only way that they could get such
an impression would be from Mr. Hansen himself, since
none of them knew of the facts except as related by him.
Counsel seem to contend, although rather half-heartedly,
that the employer's reports of the injury and the letters
from the plaintiffs' attorneys are evidence that Mr. Hanse:n was injured March 17th while in the course of his
employment. In the first place there isn't a word in these
documents that indicates that Mr. Hansen was in the
course of his employment. Secondly, as already indicated, the employer and his attorrneys were at all times
until the last hearing, laboring under the misapprehension as to the facts, which misapprehension was later
corrected 'by withdrawal from the stipulation, as already
indicated. Thirdly, neither Mr. Hickman who made the
first report of irnjury, nor Mr. H·ohl who made the final
report, could bind the plaintiffs by any statements of
theirs; and fourthly, none of those documents are evidence.
Thi·s court said in the case of Roberts v. Industrial
Commission, 93 Pac. (2d) 494, a very recent case, August
15,1939:
"Apparently it was thought that so long as evidence upon that question wa~s on file in the office
·of the Industrial Commission in the form or reports by Roberts as a hotel proprietor, it was unnecessary to introduce those reports in evidence;
that they could be' judicially noticed' and attached
to the record. If such was the thought it was an
error. Each re·cord of trial under this law should
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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be kept in and of itself. Each deme·nt ~nect>ssary
to sustaiH an order by the trib1wal or comm,i.._c:sion
under this law should be supported by testimony,
exhibi-ts, or stipuhz.tion introdu<-ed at the hearing.
The rule i.s ·no di/lerent than that in i·ndu..c:trial
accidents." (Italics added.).

Eve-n if the reports and letters were part of the
record they are not evidence, as we have already pointed
out. .As a matter of fact this eourt bas squarely held
that even the payment of compensation does not preclude
the employer from denying liability later.

In Taggert v. Industrial Co-mmission of Utah, 79
Utah 598, 12 Pac. (2d) 356, at page 602 of the Utah
report·s tbis court said :
"The applicant contends that the carrier admowledged that Taggert met with an accident and it
does not lie in its mouth later to deny that Taggert
met with an accident which caused his death. *
* * Tbis contention is untenable."
·Tbis, of course, must be the rule. The employer amd
the insurance carrier, relying upon the employee's statement, make their reports and pay compensation. Later
it is discovered that the employee's statements are untrue. Certainly thB law does not permit him to gain am
advantage by bis deception.
There are certain letters and reports of Dr. Root
relied on in the record. But Dr. Root testified that the
only information he had was received from Mr. Hansen.
(2 T. 12, 13)
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The testimony of Miss Peterson is very significant.
March 17, 1938 was on a Thursday. On either 'Thursday
or Friday, :J\Ilarch 17 or 18, 1938, Miss Peterson rode with
Mr. Hansen from Ce1nterfield tn Richfield. This was
after the alleged injury of :March 17th which Mr. Hansen
said occurred as he was proceeding south .of Payson at
10 :30 A. M. ISo when he saw Miss Peterson it was after
the time of his alleged accident and she says that she
didn't notice a1ny di·sability and be did not complain of
any, nor did be on the following Sunday when she was
riding wi tb him in the evening on the way to Gunnison,
and it was not until that occasion when they did have an
accident and be received a terrible jolt that be complained
of pain in his stomach.
He spent that night, Sunday night, (2 T. 29, 30) in
Gunnison, returni1ng to Ogden the next day. His son
stated that he saw his father at Ogden the day after the
accident (1 T. 21), and that it was either Sunday or Monday. (1 T. 27) Obviously it wa,s Monday be-cause, as we
have seen, Sunday he was in Gunnison. 'This is a very
material bit of evidence, be,cause the son could only have
learned of the aecident from his father, so that obviously
the father bad told him on Monday that the accident bad
happened the previous day, which is the day testified to
by Miss Peterson.
As we have already stated, even had there been evidence of an accident on the 17th there is nothing in the
record to show that it was that accident, instead of the
one on the 20th, that was responsi'ble for his injury. The
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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illlference is that it was not sinee he complnhwd of no
disability until after the aceident of the ~Oth. He did not
see Dr. Root until Wednesday, March 23rd, at which time
Dr. Root stated that he was in a serious condition and in
no condition to drive an automo·bile. He was not in this
condition prior to the accident of March 20th.

III.
Counsel contend that under the provisions of 104-492 (3), Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, the testimony of
Miss Peterson was incompetent. This provision of the
statute has absolutely no application whatever to this
case. Miss Peterson is not a party to the controversy,
is not interested therein, and is not claiming anything
from anyone.

IV.
We have examined the cases cited by the defendant.
Many of them sustailll the very point that we are arguing
for, namely, that the Commission had a discretionary
power to permit the withdrawal of the stipulation. Others
are not in P?int at all Either no application for withdrawal was made, or made for the first time on appeal.
Still others simply do not contailll the language quoted
as coming therefrom.
Counsel say that because they were present for the
fir,st time at the last hearing they could have had no
knowledge of the previous state of the record. There was
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only one reason for the continua1nce of the case and that
was for the reception and admission of the testimony of
the plaintiffs controverting the conte;ntion that Marins
Hansen was injured in the course of his employment
March 17, 1938. That was why the hearing wa,s continued
until the followi•ng day. Up to that time the applicants
had not been represented by counsel. But when the hearing was continued f.or the above stated purpose they appeared with counsel. It must be perfectly obvious that
the reason counsel was employed was to meet the changed
conditions. Else why employ counsel at that stage of the
proceedings~ If counsel's clients failed to appraise them
of the situation that cannot change the record. In fact
counsel almost concede that their arguments are not very
meritorious. On page 14 .of their brief they say:
''If the contention of the plaintiffs, that the Commis·sion had to permit the withdrawal of their
stipulation, be accepted hy this court as the law,
then this court should return the whole matter to
the Industrial Commission for an entire rehearing.''
Here counsel not only recog.nize that our so-called
admis,sion was a stipulation but that the withdrawal of
the stipulation withdrew all evidence from which the
Commission ;could make a :finding. Of course, we all
know that all this court can do is either affirm or set
aside the order of the Commission. Counsel likewise
contend that •no real reason was given to justify the withdrawal of the ,stipulation.

The best reason in the world

was that it was untrue, and this was clearly pointed out.
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The contention is nlso madL' that bet•nthw wl' paid ('Olllpensation without objeetion we admitted our liability. c.>
have also answered this contention.

'r

There is absolutely no e\-idL'nep in tlw record to sustain the finding of the Commission that Marius Ha~nseu
was injured March 1 j, Hl3S, or nny other time, by an
accident arising out of or in the rourse of his employment. The award of the Commission should be set aside.
Respectfully submitted,
DEYIXE, HoWELL & SnxE
NEIL

R.

SHIRLEY

AND

OLMSTEAD,

P.

Jo:~ms,

Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
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